Check-in passagerer og bagage i luftfarten gennem 44 år Dette er et forsøg på at skrive lidt om udviklingen af check-in processen fra dengang alt foregik manuelt til en situation, hvor passagererne kan betjene sig selv – mere eller mindre.
Jeg – Jens Otto
Pedersen:
Begyndelsen: Billetkuponen blev med rørpost – befordret af trykluft - sendt til
’logbogen’, hvor en ’fordeler’ spredte kuponerne efter rute nummer til
forskellige skriveborde i ’manifesteringen’ via et
’fordelingstransportbånd’. Den ansvarlige for en given rute noterede passagerens køn, stykker
bagage og vægt + evt. vægt af håndbagage på et ’passenger and bagage
weight sheet’. Kort før afgang lukkedes check-in til den pågældende rute, og
manifesteringen fik travlt med at opsummere antal passagerer delt op i
mænd, kvinder, børn og spædbørn pr. klasse, samt antal stykker bagage og
deres vægt + evt. håndbagage, alt sammen selvfølgelig optalt per klasse
og destination på ruten. Tallene blev hurtigt givet videre til den
trafikmedarbejder, som var ansvarlig for udregning af flyets vægt- og
balanceforhold, som blev dokumenteret på et ’loadsheet’. Samtlige
dokumenter for flyet blev lagt i ’logtasken’, og trafikmedarbejderen
bragte logtasken til flyet, evt. på cykel, henvendte sig til kaptajnen i
cockpittet, hvor informationerne blev gennemgået og kaptajnen signerede.
Så var der klar til afgang – med mindre der lige skulle tages højde for
nogle sene passagerer, så der skulle laves nogle ’last minute changes’ (LMC)
på loadsheetet. Når flyet var rullet væk fra standpladsen, var der en hel del arbejde
med at samle og videresende oplysninger til næste station på ruten:
information om den totale last på flyet, hvilke lastrum bagage, fragt og
post lå i til de forskellige destinationer, hvor mange passagerer der
skulle rejse videre med andre fly, og på visse ruter skulle der sendes
TPM eller TPS (navnelister med forskellige ekstra oplysninger), og
endelig skulle billetkuponer og andre dokumenter samles i en kuvert til
afregningen.
Første skridt i
automatiseringen: Ved hjælp af et antal ’matrix plader’ med forskellig udstansning i højre
side kunne check-in ekspedienten vælge rute og segment for en
ekspedition. Matrix pladen kunne skubbes ind i keysettet, og når
ekspedienten med ’koordinattaster’ havde valgt rute og segment, kunne
han/hun ved hjælp af få taster angive klasse, passagertype,
bookingstatus, antal passagerer og stykker baggage (evt. vægt) og
gennemføre registrering af check-in. Svaret til keysettet var en eller
flere lysende lamper – grøn for OK, rød for afvist (flyet fuldt) og gult
med et par tallamper angav ’standby’ og reference nummer. Man behøvede ikke længere manuelt at notere og opsummere antallet af
passagerer og mængden af bagage, men kunne kort før afgang ’lukke’ flyet
og printe det færdige loadsheet ud. Zebraen betjente kun København og kørte ikke i døgndrift, men blev hver
morgen ’madet’ med dagens trafikprogram via papirtape, hvorefter
ekspedition til dagens fly kunne påbegyndes.
Andet skridt. IBM 1410-eren kørte stort set i døgndrift, og trafikprogrammet blev ikke
– som med Zebraen – fyldt i computeren hver morgen, men kun to gange om
året. Desuden kunne man med 1410-eren betjene andre lufthavne end
København, så Stockholm og Oslo (og måske Göteborg) kom til. Registrering af check-in skete fortsat via keysets og kun numerisk.
Allerede dengang var det muligt at checke-in til flere ruter i en
omgang. København var udgangspunktet for de fleste ruter til byer i
Europa, og ved check-in f.eks. i Stockholm på en lokal rute til
København kunne ekspedienten kombinere check-in på SK403 STOCPH med
SK635 CPHFRA, så SAS kunne ’spare’ på check-in personalet i CPH. Denne form for numerisk check-in fortsatte efter IBM 1410 tiden fra 1969
på Univac 494. Univac 494 blev ikke videreudviklet af Univac (senere
Unisys). Det blev 1100-serien, som fortsat blev udbygget med fremtiden
for øje – Univac 494 blev dømt ude af drift i midten af 70-erne, men
sådan skulle det ikke gå. Et nyt reservations system blev udviklet af
Univac/Unisys i samarbejde med et antal luftfartsselskaber (heriblandt
Lufthansa og SAS) på computere af 1100-typen, og det lykkedes v.h.a.
software at få 1100 til at kunne operere i 494-mode. På den måde kunne
metoden for numerisk check-in fortsætte med større og mindre ændringer
og forbedringer.
Tredje skridt. Seating processen ændrede sig også i løbet af årene. Metoden med en
seating coordinator i manifeste-ringen begrænsede seating til få
(oversøiske) ruter. For at gøre dette mere fleksibelt (og spare
mandskab) prøvede man med nogle store seatmaps opsat på stander ved
gaten, hvor passagererne selv kunne vælge blandt ledige sæder, knipse
seat stubben af og klæbe den på boardingpasset. Det medførte
selvfølgelig, at der tæt på afgangstid stadig var et tilstrækkeligt
antal ledige sæder, men det var enkelt sæder spredt over hele kabinen,
så det var vanskeligt/umuligt at finde samlede seats til f.eks. familier
med børn. I første omgang førte det til, at den ansvarlige ’gatemanager’
’reserverede’ et antal seats samlet (tog bort seat stubs), så man stadig
kunne tilgodese familier, som kom relativt sent til udgangen. Systemet
med de store seatmaps blev erstattet af et med mindre seatmaps, som blev
betjent af ’gatemanageren’ og ikke af passagererne selv. I slutningen af 70-erne blev et system for automatisk seating og
udskrivning af boardingpass udviklet og implementeret. Ved check-in
skranken kunne ekspedienten sammen med den numeriske check-in
transaktion angive sæde ønske (enten i form af en eller flere ’options’
eller som specifikt sæde). Systemet fandt så sæder svarende til de
angivne options og ændrede status fra ’available’ til ’occupied’,
alternativt verificerede at de angivne sæder var ledige med tilhørende
ændring af status. Display af seatplan var også mulig på skærmen, så
ekspedienten kunne vejlede passageren. Boardingpasses for en eller flere
ruter med rutenummer, destination, seat o.s.v. blev så automatisk
printet, og billetkuponen blev lagt ind i boardingpass, så passageren
selv bar rundt på sit rejsedokument. Men der var stadig ikke nogen
maskinel registrering af relationen mellem en navngiven passager og et
specifikt seat.
Fjerde skridt. Computeren skulle være Tandem Non Stop, som Linjeflyg havde haft
relativt stor succes med. Det krævede en del omskoling af os EDB-folk,
og en projektgruppe bestående af repræsentanter for hovedstationerne og
Data Services blev etableret i København. Det skulle være et system med
fuld udnyttelse af informationerne fra reservationssystemet om
passagerernes navne, sædeønsker, videre rejse, specielle noter o.s.v.,
og systemet skulle omfatte både check-in, loadcontrol, loadplanning og
post departure håndtering – altså den ’forgyldte løsning’ på
automatisering og rationalisering af håndteringen af passagerer, bagage,
fragt og post i lufthavnene. Og systemet skulle kunne implementeres
overalt, hvor det fandtes hensigtsmæssigt. Efter et par år blev projektet imidlertid skrottet på beslutning af Jan
Lapidoth. Vi havde fået beskrevet en masse god funktionalitet, men der
var endnu lang vej til et kørende system. Nedlæggelsen af projektet
fjernede dog ikke behovet for et mere moderne check-in system med
registrering af passagerernes navne og tilhørende information til
rationalisering af forretningsgangen i lufthavnene. Så i stedet blev det besluttet at udvikle et midlertidigt og skrabet
system på Unisys 1100 platformen, som skulle fungere i 1-2 år – indtil
man havde fundet den endelige fremtidige løsning. De væsentligste
funktioner på passager området fra PALCO 2 blev identificeret, og en
’skrabet’ udgave af et system til ’name check-in’ blev taget frem –
stadig baseret på fuld udnyttelse af allerede registreret passager
information fra reservationssystemet og med hele ’post departure’
håndteringen. Loadcontrol (vægt og balance) skulle fortsat køre
uforandret som Univac 494 emuleret på 1100, mens ’name check-in’ skulle
nyudvikles som et rigtigt 1100 system – med fuld integration til det
gamle loadcontrol; men p.g.a. den skrabede model skulle mest mulig
eksisterende funktionalitet bibeholdes. F.eks. forblev hele seating
funktionaliteten i 494-emulering, så det blev nødvendigt at udvikle et
program i 1100 mode (36 bits per ord), som kunne læse og opdatere en
record i 494-mode (30 bits per ord). Systemet havde en kort udviklingstid (omkring 1 år) og blev
implementeret gradvis fra begyndelsen af 1985.
Og siden …. Loadcontrol systemet er undervejs blevet genudviklet i forbedret form
som et IBM system. Følgende er en liste over funktionalitet, som – i tillæg til stadige
forbedringer – er kommet til i PCI systemet siden implementeringen:
·
Seating
funktionaliteten er blevet genudviklet i 1100 mode og væsentlig
forbedret og moderniseret.
·
Automatisk printning af bagagetags med tilhørende afsendelse af BSM til
sorteringsanlæg.
·
Såkaldt
’retur check-in’ i forbindelse med endags rejser, så
’forretningsrejsende’ allerede ved check-in om morgenen blev forsynet
med boardingpass til eftermiddagens returflyvning.
·
Registrering af Eurobonus kort ved check-in og efterfølgende
afrapportering. Senere udvidet til at håndtere også andre selskabers
’frequent flyer programmer’.
·
Edifact
kommunikation med andre selskabers check-in systemer i.f.m. rejseruter,
som involverer flere selskaber med forskellige handling systemer.
·
Formidling af information til immigrationsmyndigheder om ankommende
passagerer.
·
Det
fulde ’license plate concept’, hvor systemet registrerer hver enkelt
bagagetag med rejserute, ejer, og afsendelse af bagage relaterede
meddelelser til sorteringssystemer og transfer stationer.
·
E-ticket funktionalitet (electronic ticketing) er kommet til, i første
omgang med SAS’s egne E-tickets og senere udvidet til at dække andre
selskabers E-tickets.
·
Understøttelse af en række ’Front-ends’ med deraf følgende muligheder
for selvbetjening for passagererne, hvor de v.h.a. billetnummer,
reservationsnummer, creditcard eller Eurobonus kort selv kan gennemføre
check-in i automater, få udskrevet bagagetags og aflevere bagage ved et
’baggage drop’.
Retur til toppen
Reservation
System History in SAS
CPH OCT89/OAS 1958 The first step into
automation was taken that year. SAS purchased an
Availability System from Standard Electric Lorenz, which was
‘programmed’ by means of input from a large Master console
keyboard. The user terminal s were
also of the push-button type, where an agent by inserting a selected
metal-plate into the key-set, and by using the push-buttons to
indicate month and date, and one button to indicate selected column
and two buttons to indicate selected rows, could get information
from the system if the selected flight on the selected segment was
open for sale or not. The metal-plate was covered by a piece of
paper, where in each row the Flight number and the stations flown
were indicated. The key-set reply was in the
form of two lamps above each column, one GREEN and one RED. GREEN
was ok to sell up to a maximum of 4 seats, RED was an indication,
that the segment in question was fully-booked, and RED/GREEN was an
indication, that there were a few number of seats available, and
that a 'NEED' message was required If a sale was acceptable,
then the agent send a teletype message to Central Space Control
indicating flight number, date, segment, number of seats sold, and
specified the name of the passenger and other relevant information.
If it was a 'NEED' message, then the Central Space Control had to
reply by yes or no on teletype to the requestor. Inventory was maintained by
band on large Al-size cards, one card for each flight/day in the
control period. No reservation input was
possible, the system was for information only 1961 That year SAS introduced a
RAMAC 305 from IBM, which was programmable, and the Reservation
System was programmed by SAS. The memory in the system consisted of
a few working registers and a magnetic drum, on which the program
statements were stored, and where a number of working tracks could
be used. Each of the 20 program tracks on the drum contained 10
statements, which could be read into a register one statement at a
time. It was possible to jump from one program step to another
program step on another track be means of directing the jump through
an external wiring-panel. Storage of data was on a
magnetic disk consisting of 25 magnetic plates where data was
accessed by means of one 'ARM' which could be moved on command from
disc-plate to disc-plate. The system accepted input in
form of Punch-Cards, which was automatica1ly produced on basis of
the above mentioned Teletype Messages with information about seats
sold by a particular agent. The Teletype Messages were punched on
paper tape, which then were fed into an IBM 047 cardpunch machine
for production of a punch-card. The punch-cards were then manually
fed into the RAMAC system, where the flight inventory was updated.
The System was online only for input from special terminal s at
Space Control, where inquiries concerning status of the booking
situation could be given, and where updates through the Master
Keyboard on the Availability System were given. The capacity of the System
was in the neighborhood of 1500 cards per hour. The same old push-button
key-set were still in use. The punch-cards were after
use on the RAMAC system stored in a file cabinet, and used to
produce name lists on the flights at request from Space Control. 1965 The follow-on System to the
RAMAC 305, an IBM 1410 dual system, for Reservations as well as Load
Control, was introduced. The system was programmed in Autocoder, and
was a leap forward in technology, and for the first time it was
possible from the same old Key-sets to book directly on the System,
followed by a Teletype Message as before, but now fed directly into
the system, where the Names were updated to the System
automatically The time lack between the
booking of the seat from the keyset and later update of the Names,
forced Central Space Control to frequently compare number of Names
to number of seats sold. Central memory consisted of
64 Kbytes, of which the operating system occupied approx 15 Kb. The
major part of the reservation system was resident in memory and
additional program modules could be added in 3 separate working
areas. Storage of DATA was
performed on disk, where we now had one 'ARM' fixed per plate, and
that reduced access time considerably. At this time we also
introduced dual storage of safety reasons for the first time. 1967 On 08NOV that year, SAS
ordered the follow-on System, based on UNIVAC 494. Three systems
were ordered, one for Reservations, one for Load Control and one as
fall-back. The operating system was
standard UNIVAC, but in order to introduce online processing, we had
to have a Transaction Monitor System (TCS) developed. This was
designed by SAS with assistance from a US-Consultancy firm, and
developed by UNIVAC Storage was now back again
to DRUMS, where three different types were introduced. One type
rather small in capacity with an access time in 4.5 msec, a medium
size with an access time of 17.5 msec and the large size with access
time about 35 msec. We started development with
the intention to convert the old system functions to the new
technology, with very little additional functionality, in principle
still an inventory system. The system was finally
introduced in JAN69, and was by SAS intended to be used for online
as well as all batch applications in SAS. The intention was to
utilize the surplus capacity during evenings, nights and weekends
for this production. The first system developed
and implemented was the Batch Accounting System (ACS) for the entire
company. 1974 The 494 RES-system was in
this year enhanced with full-PNR capability by introducing VDU
Screens as replacement for the old keysets. Replacement of key sets
by VDU's was performed over the next 3-4 years. 1975 In that year automatic
Ticketing was developed and introduced. 1976 In this year SAS introduced
an own developed Passenger Accounting System (PAS). UNIVAC then, to our
surprise, de-committed the 494 equipment-line in favor of the 1100
equipment-line. The 1100 equipment line was different from 494, so
SAS was forced to start looking for a replacement to 494. The decision by UNIVAC was
bad for SAS but understandable seen from UNIVAC business point of
view, as the 1100 line had proved more acceptable to the industry
than the 494, even if the 1100 line in the beginning was intended
for scientific use only. 1977 SAS decided to continue with
UNIVAC on the 1100 line of equipment, but intended to have UNIVAC to
develop the new reservation system based on requirements from the
user community. SAS together with Lufthansa, North West Airlines and
a few other smaller Airlines, developed a set of requirements based
on which the USAS*systems should be developed SAS had during the 3 year
development period, data personnel stationed in Minneapolis
participating in and monitoring this development The system was moved to CPH
late 1979 for final SAS enhancements and acceptance test and
implemented in March 1980 The system has since been
maintained and further developed by UNIVAC in Minneapolis, but no
new versions of USAS*, except one for USAS*TKT, have ever been
introduced in the SAS environment. The reason for this was
caused by OUT being the first to introduce the standard USAS*Systems.
During the intense acceptance test period in CPH, all errors found
was corrected by SAS and UNIVAC on site, and the error report was
then forwarded to Minneapolis for inclusion into the standard
system. We corrected several thousands errors but the majority of
errors was rejected by Minneapolis, they said they could not
reproduce the error on their own system. Therefore the difference
between OUT version and their version grew to such proportions, that
we didn’t dare to start all over again with the standard system. During the following years,
where the demand for compute power grew and grew, it created
problems on several occasions for SAS. Every time we were on the
brink of inadequate compute power, we had to use unorthodox methods
to survive. The hardware plans in UNISYS were late and not always in
time, and this has added to the determination to look for a
replacement.
SAS Reservations
Erindringer om forhistorien
I forbindelse med
salget af det tidligere SAS Data til CSC har
jeg tænkt tilbage på udviklingen inden for
SAS reservationssystemer, som jeg har
oplevet i tiden fra 1947 til indflytningen i
SASCO-fortet 12. september 1966.
På min første dag
01AUG47 som trafikelev i det gamle DDL, Det
Danske Luftfartselskab besøgte elevholdet
"Bookingen" i den gamle tyske officersbarak,
Hubertus på Pedersdalvej bag ved hangar 2,
som var under opførelse. - På et langt bord
havde man ved snoretræk mulighed for at køre
en kasse med reservationskort frem og
tilbage mellem de medarbejdere, der sad på
hver side af det lange bord.
Fjernskrivere var
endnu ikke indført, så hastereservationer
kunne enten foretages pr. telegram eller
telefon, hvilket kostede ekstra for
passagererne. Den billigste metode var
"Memo", som var en håndskrevet
reservationsanmodning, der blev sendt gratis
som Company mail.
Næste besøg fandt sted
på Rådhuspladsen 59 i ret små og mørke
lokaler. Jørgen Ludvigsen, som senere kom
til SAS Data, var rundviser ved begge besøg.
Efter min soldatertid besøgte jeg påny
Bookingen maj 1951. Afdelingen var flyttet
tilbage til Hubertus. Denne gang gjaldt
besøget en nyoprettet afdeling for
Fragtbooking og Load Planning, LPC under
ledelse af C.O.Møller med Ernst Leth som
næstkommanderende.
12. oktober samme år
blev C.O.Møller udlånt til oprettelse af en
trafikskole, og jeg blev for en 3-måneders
periode udlånt fra mit job som administrativ
assistent for Fragtchefen for at rykke ind
på den nederste plads i LPC. C.O.Møller kom
aldrig tilbage til denne afdeling, og mit
udlån fortsatte på ubegrænset tid. Bookingen
var da flyttet fra Hubertus til den nu
nedrevne kontorbygning, der lå i forbindelse
med Hangar 1.
Her var der opstillet
rotorer/karruseller, der betød, at 4
arbejdspositioner på samme tid havde adgang
til de kasser med bookingkort, der var
placeret efter regioner : Oversøisk, Europa,
Skandinavien, Indenrigs og "Offline". I
starten kom alle meldinger pr. fjernskriver
via piccolo, men hurtigt blev der langs hele
vinduesvæggen opstillet transportbånd med
udkast ved hver position og returbånd til
telegramcentralen for afsendelse af svar til
salgskontorerne.
I løbet af 1952 skete
der afgørende ændringer, idet en
centralisering fandt sted sådan, at
bookingkontorerne i OSL og STO kun beholdt
egne indenrigsruter, mens alle andre ruter
udgående fra Skandinavien blev samlet i
CPHRE. Hermed begyndte tankerne om en
mekanisering, hvor Lars Ewald Jørgensen blev
medlem af IATA-gruppen for udvikling af et
fælles fjernskriverformat for reservationer
. Systemet fik navnet AIRIMP, Airline
Interline Reservations Message Processing og
dannede grundlaget for den senere
mekanisering af reservationsprocessen, som
under kyndig og fremtidsorienteret ledelse
blev forestået af den norske ingeniør Roald
Bugge, som lavede en 5-trins plan, der blev
overhalet af den teknologiske udvikling, da
Fase 4-projektet efter et års udvikling blev
skrottet 1961, fordi radiorør/elektronrør
nåede at blive forældet, inden udstyret blev
monteret.
I mellemtiden havde vi
1958 i kælderen under
Hammerichsgade-kontorerne installeret
SPAS-systemet, Space Availability,mens den
løbende opdatering fandt sted i CPHRU i
lufthavnen under ledelse af Eigil
Nicolaisen, som netop var hjemkommet efter
udstationering i NBO.
Samtidig blev jeg selv
involveret i RTPR-projektet (Reservations,
Transmission & Processing of Reservations .
Dette projekt gik ud på at mekanisere
navnerapportering for alle passagerer ved
hjælp af hulkort. I projektgruppen var Ernst
Leth leder med Helge Ussinger og mig som
hjælpere. Ingen af os havde bil, heller ikke
cheferne. For nutidens unge kan det være
svært at forstå, at vi heller ikke havde
privattelefon, som var en decideret
mangelvare. På trods af, at jeg som leder af
CPHRT, Departure Control stod på listen over
dem, der skulle tilkaldes ved evt.
fly-ulykker, lykkedes det ikke
Kommunikationschefen Verner Bak at skaffe
en telefon hos KTAS. I stedet måtte jeg
tilkaldes pr. telegram.!
Samtidig med opførelse
af den ny lufthavnsbygning (nuv. Terminal
2) til indvielse 1960 var der etableret nye
projekter til videreudvikling efter Roald
Bugges plan. Dette medførte mange besøg i
Stuttgart, hvor Standard Elektrik Lorenz ,
SEL byggede computerne til SAS. I foråret
1961 var planen, at vi skulle overføre
kontrollen med passagerernes navne til en ny
IBM computer Ramac 305, som skulle stå på 2.
sal i den nye afgangshal. På et tidspunkt,
hvor vi langt inde i denne proces, blev der
vendt helt om. Nu skulle Ramac 305 i stedet
anvendes til den numeriske kontrol, Seat
Inventory. I løbet af en week-end blev Ernst
Leth erstattet af Arne Hansen fra
Kommunikationsafdelingen, og jeg fik besked
på at møde mandag morgen hos IBM
H.C.Andersens Boulevard 38 til kursus sammen
med Arne Hansen og en ret nyansat
teletekniker Freddy Kirkegaard.Begge var
kommet fra P&T og var kyndige i relæ-teknik,
mens min andel var at stå for de
reservationsmæssige aspekter. Ramac 305 var
ligesom IBM 407 baseret på programmering ved
hjælp af koblingspaneler med snører, der
styrede de krævede processer. I løbet af et
halvt år havde Freddy fået etableret de
fleste programmer og fik 2 nye programmører
fra Fragtbookingen med på holdet : Jørgen
Jespersen og Ove A.Schøning .Disse 3 dannede
dermed også det første operatørteam, da
maskinen kom drift 20. november 1960. Freddy
kom dog hurtigt videre til Fase 4 projektet,
som senere blev skrottet, da IBM havde
konstrueret IBM 1410, som med betydeligt
mindre pladskrav havde en kapacitet, der på
alle områder gjorde SEL's DB 70 forældet
endnu før fremstillngen var tilendebragt.
Både Jørgen Jespersen
og Ove Schøning kom sammen med Freddy til at
danne grundstammen i udviklingen af IBM 1410
med udstationering på fabrikken i
Corbeil-Essonnes uden for Paris. I
forbindelse med Curt Nicolins store
forandringer af SAS blev Vicepræsidenten for
Communications , Roald Bugge med kort varsel
erstattet af Charlie Reuterskiöld. Parallelt
med udviklingen af reservationssystemerne
var der tilsvarende aktiviteter på Load
Control og Passenger Check-in siden.
Disse projekter var
udviklet af fælles arbejdsgrupper fra
Kommunikationsafdelingen, Bookingen og
Stationen, men blev fra 1. juli 1964
samordnet i den nyoprettede Data Services
afdeling som også havde afdelinger i STO og
OSL . Arne Hansen forlod hermed sit job som
Bookingchef og blev Programmeringschef for
CPHXP med ansvar for afdelingerne STOXP med
Egon Sandell som chef og OSLXP med Jorun
Grundseth.
Systemchef var Hans
Ekstedt, der tidligere havde ledet
Trafikskolen og derpå stået for udviklingen
af Load Control systemerne med ZEBRA som
første produkt.
Helge Hansen
(HHA)
Ove A.
Schøning (OAS)
Jørgen
Jespersen (JJ)
Freddy
Kirkegaard (FJK)
John Brix
Petersen (BIX)
Hans
Sandegaard (HLS)
Jens Jørgen
Kristensen(JJK)
Laief
Nicolaisen (LNI)
Eigil
Nicolaisen (NIC)
Verny
Falkeborg (VFA)
Bent Mårup
(MUP)
I efteråret 1964 var
verdenspressen inviteret til demonstration
af IBM 1410 på fabrikken ved Paris, mens den
egentlige indvielse fandt sted på 2. sal i
afgangshallen med statsministerfruen Helle
Virkner i spidsen som "snoreklipper" fulgt
af SAS præsident Karl Nilsson og IBM's
øverste præsident Wilson. Dette blev en
tv-begivenhed i stil med åbningerne af
polarruterne til Los Angeles og Tokyo.
Bent Mårup
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Torsten Bergner | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Nedenstående er "klippet" fra FRIDA, som er Scandinavian IT Group's intranet.
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'ET LIV
I LUFTEN' - skrevet af
Søren Bertelsen Sådan kaldte
tidligere pressechef i SAS Søren Bertelsen sin bog,
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jun03
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My working life
after SAS DATA…
Retur til
toppen
The appointment to become the IT
head of Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) – VP & GM SAS DATA - was in fact a
surprising challenge to me. Everybody was aware of the national ‘out of balance’
in the SAS senior management team (too many Swedes) and the head-hunter assigned
to find the successor of Toralv Korsvold had the ‘marching order’ to find a Dane
or a Norwegian. To cut a long story short, thanks to a ‘coup d’etat’ by the
entire management population of SAS DATA, I was asked to come back to the SAS
DATA I had left only a few months earlier, to head the organisation temporarily
while the external search was going on.
Things obviously worked out very well – in January 1982 Jan Carlzon asked if I
was willing to accept the position permanently, which I gladly did.
Six very challenging years as the commander of the IT organisation! A period of
many changes – the prime one probably being the increased IT awareness in the
society, leading to significant user – or ‘customer’ as we had started to call
them – demands for more independency from the centralised IT organisation.
Although SAS DATA was a separate business unit in the SAS Group – we did not
have our own balance sheet and the P&L was in essence only a ‘funny money’
reflection. No real business challenges – although at that time I was surely
believing so.
After 5-6 years in this position, I started to feel ‘time to move on’ and when
AMADEUS was formed and I was offered the CEO position, this was an opportunity I
couldn’t turn down.
My wife Birgitta and our youngest daughter Maria moved to Madrid in August 1987,
the two older children were already in university.
SAS had been invited to join
AMADEUS as a founding airline very late. Air France, Iberia and Lufthansa had
already been talking for a long time. The European airlines were divided into
two groups and SAS had not yet decided which one would suit best. We had
‘secret’ meetings with both sides – AMADEUS and Galileo.
SAS had already a revised IT strategy approved by Board which included a gradual
migration of the Unisys main frame applications to an IBM platform. Therefore
Air France, Iberia and Lufthansa - the all-Unisys airlines that had formed
AMADEUS - were not the ideal partners to SAS seen from an IT point of view.
Commercially however, the AMADEUS airlines were more similar to SAS, with strong
home markets and a reasonable good control over the travel agency market – SAS
was then the 100% owner of Nyman&Schulz in Sweden and Bennett in Norway, as two
examples. So, we adopted the approach that “go with AMADEUS but convince the
other founding airlines to adopt an IBM strategy as well”, thereby killing two
birds with one stone.
After some resistance, it worked. Lufthansa was the easiest partner to convince
and Air France the most difficult since they had just signed a long term
extension deal with Unisys. As a compromise, we agreed to stay on a Unisys
platform with our Fare Quote system – big in the Unisys world, minor in the IBM
world. Everybody was happy!!
I could write a book about how the four airlines tried to ‘win’ by having the
AMADEUS offices set up in their respective home countries. SAS advocated for
Brussels since this was the time when we were in deep and serious negotiations
with Sabena. Loads of politics and loads of promises – and threats… Finally it
was decided that the Holding and Marketing companies were to be located to
Madrid, the Development company to Sophia Antipolis on the French Riviera and
the Operations company to Erding outside Munich.
System One was selected as the applications provider and an extensive
customisation project was launched in Miami, with IBM as the System Integrator
and System One, Amadeus and the four founding airlines as the project owners and
participants. At its peak, the project team had more than 1000 members.
Initially the four airlines seconded approximately 80 persons to AMADEUS as its
kernel. Thereafter, the AMADEUS Board gave me the instructions NOT to hire more
people from the founders, but rather look for staff in the outside market.
While the huge IT project was struggling in the US, the real commercial ‘rat
race’ had began on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, in Europe, in Asia, in
Africa and in South- & Central America The rat race had as its goal to attract
more airlines and eventually other travel service providers. For AMADEUS to be
seen as neutral vis-à-vis other airlines, The Board demanded that the CEO and
his direct reports cut all their strings to the parent airlines and my
employment in SAS was therefore terminated during the fall of 1987.
It was a fantastic spirit in the company with an enthusiasm and optimism that
could move mountains… We were a UN in miniature with almost 40 different
nationalities spread over 4-500 people – moving up to approximately 800 when I
left 3.5 years later. Not so many from SAS; Hans Jorgensen, Alan Voss, Jesper
Lossow, Bjarne Ströbeck were a few of the SAS-Danes on AMADEUS payroll. We were
travelling the world – I did not learn many words of Spanish and I did not see
my family that often. We had superb offices in the heart of Madrid – just across
the road from the Bernabeu stadium.
If I had not realised earlier that my IT knowledge – with IBM 1401 and 360 as
the flagships in my short programmer career – was outdated, I did have to face
reality now! But, I also found that the strategy and commercial sides of the
airline industry thrilled me more. Having the privilege to head the build up an
organisation like AMADEUS was a God’s gift. The build up of the legal and
financial structures – of which I had no clue from SAS – the human resources
systems & processes, the company culture, the market- and media communication
sector and the non airline side of the travel industry, were all areas where I
learnt unbelievably much! My future jobs after AMADEUS proved that it had been a
very good school.
Spring 1990, the AMADEUS Group structure had been finally set up, we had
attracted a number of additional ‘participating carriers’ and we had implemented
a few forerunners of the main system. I felt I could not add very much more and
when the head-hunting company Russel-Raynolds offered me the job as CEO of
Unisys in Sweden, I felt the timing was good and accepted the offer – after
having convinced myself that the SAS exodus from Unisys almost 4 years earlier
was not blamed on me! (In hindsight we all know that SAS is still a
‘Unisys-airline’).
It was not without sentimentality I left Madrid in November 1990 but I was
pleased to be given an opportunity also to learn the ‘supplier side’ of our
industry.
Another – not so pleasant – discovery in AMADEUS was that SAS – despite we
Scandinavians had been told so from the days we were breast fed. - is NOT as big
and well respected airline as we believed. Later on in life, this unpleasant
knowledge has been confirmed many times.
When I joined Unisys in November
1990, it was in severe financial difficulties and was very often close to ‘file
chapter 11’ in the US. The share price on the NYSE was less than 2 US$. Unisys
Sweden had 800 employees and had made a loss 1989 of 10MSEK. These were the days
when a small and new but aggressive company by the name of Microsoft appeared
and started to compete with the giants IBM and Unisys.
Unisys is an American company – the characteristics of which I had never really
been aware of. The chock was not instant, but it came rapidly. By Christmas time
1990 I understood the tough and unforgiving attitude and culture they had, where
number crunching was almost more important than making the business itself.
SAS DATA was now all of a sudden one of my main customers – about which I felt
somewhat uneasy. After all, I could see that many of the contracts Unisys had
with SAS were signed by me! How would I be able to just change sides?? I did
however solve this problem in a smooth way when I convinced the European
headquarters to transfer the SAS account to Unisys-Denmark (where in fact it was
when I was the head of SAS DATA, but Bjorn Boldt-Christmas wanted it transferred
to the country where SAS’ Head office was). Per Voss, the Unisys Account Manager
to SAS was - although Danish - reluctantly transferred Unisys-Denmark (I
did later find out that he was reluctant because he made a lot of ‘per diem
money’, being employed by Unisys-Sweden but living and working in Denmark.
Hans-Henrik Hedegaard, my Unisys counter part in Denmark, later joined SAS and
was the head of SIG (the SAS IT Group) until it was sold to CSC a couple of
years ago.
One of the main reasons why I insisted on not having to deal with SAS DATA was
that the new Terese project had been launched and the scope was to develop
non-TPF code in-house in SAS DATA and – in other words – build a new Inventory
and Departure Control System (RES and PALCO would probably be the appropriate
SAS terminology) from scratch. Since SAS DATA (Bjorn Boldt-Christmas) did not
want to run into any legal problems with Unisys, being accused of copying the
Unisys legacy systems – SAS DATA requested a ‘clean sheet of bill’ from Unisys
verifying that Terese was not a copy. We (Unisys) responded “OK, no problems –
let’s just send a team of our experts to audit the design and the code and we
shall happily provide you with what you want – if all is clean”. SAS DATA did
not want us to audit the Terese design, just to give the requested ‘green light’
based on trust…! As a final attempt to get ‘off the hook’, it was proposed to
audit a sample but give the ‘go ahead’ for everything. Our American lawyers said
‘no way’! I did understand them – the relationship was at this time somewhat
sour, to say the least.
I figured out very soon that the Unisys job was nothing but a ‘clean up and turn
around’ job. The industry had at that time become so used to the term
‘downsizing’ that it invented the term ‘rightsizing’… it sounded better or at
least less dramatic. In our case, it was however a matter of downsizing – not
only applying the ‘salami-methodology’ but really taking out big and
unprofitable chunks of the organisation. Unisys also had the merge between
Sperry and Burroughs as a burden with more or less duplicate product lines. The
unsuccessful PC product line was terminated – almost as dramatic as Ericsson
gave up its PC Line of Business in the 80’s.
Interesting and educational contrasts – AMADEUS where the name of the game was
growth and build up with an enormous enthusiasm and Unisys where the name of the
game was ‘take out costs’ and return to profitability – avoid nothing, the
future is behind us! AMADEUS had no labour unions to fight with – Unisys was
similar to SAS although with fewer and less militant unions. The complex Swedish
labour law was tricky and did make redundancies difficult.
I was already in April 1992 – I had just turned 50 – approached by a British
head-hunter (Heidrick & Struggles) asking if I wanted to return to the airline
industry as the Chief Executive of the British Airways subsidiary Speedwing in
London. John Watson – my old mate as a SITA Board member – wanted me to join BA.
I remember my wife saying “if it had been Paris (I was an SAS trainee in Paris
when we were newly married) the decision would probably have been made in a
couple of weeks”. Now it took 18 months!
When I left AMADEUS, I had the intention to become just a ‘normal Swede’ and not
living in a suitcase travelling the world. However, when the head-hunter came, I
felt like a ‘sailor going ashore’ – the absence of kerosene (jet fuel) smell in
my life made me want to return to ‘where I belonged’ – the airline industry.
Although the 3 years with Unisys were very hash and emotionally tough – we
reduced the staff size from 800 to 290 and we changed a loss of 10MSEK to a
profit of 10MSEK – I learnt a lot! This was real business – no funny money, no
excuses. Very well paid with lots of extras and good bonuses, but the American
leadership style was almost rude and insulting. The Swedish company did fairly
well in its turn around project, so we were treated better than many others –
but all the dirty and insulting expressions I unintentionally still use, were
learnt from my Unisys days.
In November 1993 we packed again and returned to the ‘gipsy life’ - this time
London and Chelsea became our home and this time without children.
Before I left Unisys, I asked a few
of the ‘car experts’ for advice on which company car I should request in the UK.
The answer was “every little boy has once had the dream of owning a Jaguar – and
where else would it be more suitable to own one, than in the UK?” I did get one
– green with leather upholstery and very beautiful to look at. It lasted for 2.5
years than I crashed into a brick wall in a London round-about. My secretary –
who had heard me saying that a SAAB would have been much better – said “was that
not a little too drastic just to get a SAAB instead?’. I never got a SAAB but I
did have a Volvo (the first S80 delivered to the UK!!) after a few years with a
real horse kick BMW.
Speedwing was a 500 people BA subsidiary with an annual turn over of UK£70M
selling and delivering ‘the BA magic dust’ to the non-competing airline world.
We were in the Management consultancy and IT businesses and later established an
outsourcing arm for ‘business processing’ in Mumbai India.
British Airways was one of the world’s most profitable and successful airlines
in the mid-90’s. It had left a painful merge between BEA and BOAC behind as well
as a successful privatisation – and was now ‘the world’s favourite airline’.
Speedwing had approximately 140 active customers – most of them airlines but
also a few airports and passenger- or cargo handling agents. There were few
customers in Europe but players like British Midland, Ryan Air and Maersk used
our hosting services for reservations and departure control (check in and load
control).
One product line we had was ‘Executive lease’, i.e. we supplied high level
managers for the clients – often using BA senior staff. Unlike Scanavia – the
SAS management spin off – our consultants were still in their active age and
very attractive in the market. As an example, when the Greek Government wanted
to privatise its airline (Olympic Airways), it wanted to increase the value of
the airline and asked us to manage it for them. We supplied CEO, CFO, Heads of
Flt Ops, Engineering, Marketing and Catering for 2 years. We had similar
arrangements in Indonesia, India, Gambia and Kenya.
The build up of the Indian outsourcing organisation was a great experience. BA
wanted to benefit from the low labour costs, good infrastructure (in the urban
areas) and good language skills to help achieving some of their cost reductions
targets. For a number of reasons, BA did not want to brand the organisation as
BA and it did not want to run the business itself. The choice was to call it
World Network Services (WNS) and to ask Speedwing to run the business. We
handled most of BA’s routine work from there and we sold similar services to a
number of international airlines. SAS has today outsourced its passenger revenue
accounting to WNS. We also diversified the business into other industries, such
as insurance companies and petrol companies.
The growth was enormous and the profit was good – we were operating around the
clock and we had almost 800 employees only a few years after we started.
When the business was established, a clear ‘exit strategy’ was defined as well –
that was one of the reasons not to use British Airways branding. WNS was – as
planned - sold a few years ago – after I’d left Speedwing – giving BA a very
good return for the outfit that had grown to approximately 1500 people.
Much of our IT portfolio was based on the BA systems. When BA – and Qantas -
decided to outsource its RES and DCS systems to AMADEUS in year 2000, I felt it
was time to leave. IT was approximately 60% of our business and the plan was –
now when BA and the airlines again were facing a downturn – also to sell the
other Lines of Business. I was 58 and had promised my family to retire at 55 –
“3 years over time” as my oldest daughter said.
My almost 7 years in the UK gave me yet another privilege – this time to
continue the growth of an already growing business, different from my previous
experience. And also to move from an American English environment to a British
English. I do prefer the latter! Working in the British Airways Group was
stimulating – it was my first job without any Scandinavians or Scandinavian
influence. It was a culture with a sound balance between comfort and discomfort
– or pressure and pleasure. No panic – no nonsense, but clear, challenging and
stretched targets. When returning to Sweden in March 2000, I had already
accepted a few non-executive Board positions and a few management consultancy
assignments. AMADEUS also asked me to design – and staff - their organisation
for the BA/QF undertaking which I did.
Returning to ‘the Vaterland’ with
the objective to gradually slow down, I found after a few years that I had
failed. Although I wasn’t working 80 hours/week and constantly flying across
time zones any longer, I still spent more than I had intended at work. ‘Life
style’, is what some people call it – ‘difficult to say no’, is what I call it.
Since I left the BA-Speedwing job in the UK I have had a number of different
Boards assignments, including the Chairmanship of two start up airlines (one
Thai and one Swedish). I am still the Chairman of a small but very profitable
and growing IT company providing web-based applications to ‘Destination
promotion’ companies like Wonderful Copenhagen in Denmark, for instance.
Spring 2003, before and after the Iraqi war I was helping Qatar Airways (one of
the world’s fastest growing airlines, now bigger than SAS if you exclude SAS
domestic and Intra-Scand) to establish an IT strategy. Qatar Airways was one of
Speedwing’s customers and I became a very close friend of its dynamic CEO. The
last 12 months I have been assisting him in a number of strategic areas –
spending 2 weeks/month in Doha and 2 weeks/month in Sweden or Thailand (Bangkok,
where we have a home).
To close the loop with Thai – where I spent 4 years as the CIO in the early 70’s
- I worked 8 months full time for them from October 2003 to May 2004 assisting
the senior management in the areas of ‘Strategy implementation’ and ‘Network
Management’ and I also conducted an ‘IT Health Check’ of the department I once
was responsible to establish – very interesting.
Interesting also to work with some of the people I once recruited directly from
the university – now having moved up the ranks to become senior officers of the
airline. The Thai deputy I had 30 years ago had also ‘climbed the ladder’ and
retired as the CEO of Thai in 2002.
Retur til toppen The End
Stifteren af Data Services, (senere SAS Data) Charlie
Reuterskiöld afgik ved døden 20. marts 2006. En af de første opgaver var at få SASCO-systemet etableret
med IBM som det største projekt. Indvielsen på fabrikken i Essones ved Paris
blev gjort til en stor mediebegivenhed, som senere blev overgået ved indvielsen
i CPH. Med både SAS-præsidenten, Karl Nilsson, IBM-præsidenten Thomas Watson og
Statsministerfruen Helle Virkner-Krag som topfigurer i tv-transmissionen.
Charlie tålte ikke forsinkelser og fik bl.a. IBM til at sende udstyret med fly
fra PAR til CPH, idet en forsinkelse grundet forbud mod lastbilkørsel gennem
Tyskland i week-enden ikke kunne accepteres. Dette eksempel viser, hvordan
Charlie konstant øvede pres for at imødegå forsinkelser f.eks. ved hjælp af
overtid, konsulentbistand eller ved at købe sig til den store "mangelvare"
computertid til test og produktion. For mange kolleger betød det midlertidig
flytning af arbejdspladsen til Paris, Minneapolis, Helsinki eller Vällingby. På grund af stadig pladsmangel købte SAS 1966 i første
omgang 3 blokke på Engvej-Hedegårdsvej, Her blev kontorlandskaber for første
gang afprøvet som noget nyt i Danmark, -. og som Arne Hansen yndede at sige :
også forladt igen som de første .Navnet SASCO-fortet satte et varigt minde. Det
var Charlies ide, som for mange lød lidt krigerisk, men forklaredes med
naboskabet til Kastrup-fortet . PS! Efter sin tid i SAS fik Charlie lederposter i American
Airlines, American Express og senest som stifter af det europæiske banksystem
for udveksling af valuta-transaktioner, SWIFT. |
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